CS6250/l CSl 6250l Finall Examl (Latestl 2025/l 2026l Update)l Guidel Q/Al |l Gradel A|l 100%l Correctl (Verifiedl Answers)
Q:l (BGPl hijacking)l Whatl isl thel classificationl byl affectedl prefix?
Answer:
Concernsl IPl prefixesl thatl arel advertisedl byl BGP
1.l Exactl Prefixl Hijackingl -l Whenl twol ASl announcel al pathl forl thel samel prefix.l
2.l Sub-prefixl Hijacking:l Badl ASl worksl withl al sub-prefixl ofl thel genuinel prefixl ofl al genuinel AS.
AS1:l Advertisesl 10.10.0.0/16
AS2(Evil):l Advertisesl 10.10.0.0/24
3.l Squatting Thel Hijackingl ASl announcesl al prefixl thatl hasl notl yetl beenl announcedl byl thel ownerl AS.
Q:l (BGPl hijacking)l Whatl isl thel classificationl byl AS-Pathl announcement?
Answer:
Anl illegitimatel ASl announcesl thel AS-pathl forl al prefixl forl whichl itl doesn'tl havel ownershipl rights.
1.l Type-0l hijacking:l Thisl isl simplyl anl ASl announcl al prefixl notl ownedl byl itself.
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2.l Type-Nl hijacking:l Thisl isl anl attackl wherel thel counterfeitl ASl announcesl anl illegitimatel pathl forl al prefixl thatl itl doesl notl ownl tol createl al fakel pathl betweenl differentl ASes
3.l Type-Ul hijacking:l Inl thisl attackl thel hijackingl ASl doesl notl modifyl thel AS-PATHl butl mayl changel thel prefix
Q:l (BGPl hijacking)l Whatl isl thel classificationl byl datal planel trafficl manipulation?
Answer:
Thel intentionl ofl thel attackl isl tol hijackl thel networkl trafficl andl manipulatel thel redirectedl networkl trafficl onl itsl wayl tol thel receivingl AS.l Trafficl canl be:
a.l Dropped,l neverl reaches.l Blackholingl attack.
b.l Eavesdroppedl orl manipulatedl beforel itl receivesl thel AS,l alsol calledl al man-in-the- middle-attack
c.l Impersonated,l networkl trafficl ofl thel viciml ASl isl impersonatedl andl thel responsel tol thisl networkl trafficl isl sentl backl tol thel sender.l Thisl isl anl imposturel attack.
Q:l Whatl arel thel causesl orl motivationsl behindl BGPl attacks?
Answer:
1.l Humanl Error
2.l Targetedl Attackl -l usuallyl interceptsl networkl trafficl whilel operatingl inl stealthl mode
3.l Highl impactl attackl -l makesl theirl intentl obviousl tol causel wipespreadl disruptionl ofl services
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Q:l Whatl arel thel keyl ideasl behindl ARTEMIS?
Answer:
1.l Al configurationl file:l wherel alll thel prefixesl ownedl byl thel networkl arel listedl forl reference.l Thisl isl populatedl byl thel networkl operator
2.l Al mechanisml forl receivingl BGPl updates:l thisl allowsl receivingl updatesl froml locall routersl andl monitoringl services.l Builtl in
Q:l Whatl arel thel twol automatedl techniquesl usedl byl ARTEMISl tol protectl againstl BGPl hijacking?
Answer:
1.l Prefixl deaggregation,l announcel morel specificl prefixesl ofl al certainl prefix
2.l Mitigationl withl multiplel Originl AS:l Havel thirdl partyl organizationsl dol BGPl announcemenetsl forl al network.l Thirdl partyl receivesl al notificationl andl immediatelyl announcesl froml theirl locationsl thel hijackedl prefixes.
Networkl trafficl froml acrossl thel worldl isl attractedl tol thel thirdl partyl org,l whichl thenl scrubsl itl andl tunnelsl itl tol thel legitimatel AS.
Q:l Whatl arel twol findingsl froml ARTEMIS?
Answer:
1.l Outsourcel thel taskl ofl BGPl announcementl tol thirdl parties
2.l prefixl filteringl isl lessl optimall whenl comparedl againstl BGPl announcements.
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Q:l Explainl thel structurel ofl al DDoSl attack.
Answer:
Masterl obtainsl compromisedl slavel servers,l directsl theml tol send/floodl highl volumel trafficl tol al victim
Q:l Whatl isl spoofing,l andl howl isl relatedl tol DDoSl attack?
Answer:
Thel actl ofl settingl al falsel IPl addressl inl thel sourcel fieldl ofl al packetl withl thel purposel ofl impersonatingl al legitimatel server.l
Anotherl typel isl specifyingl thel sourcel andl destinationl IPl fieldsl tol bel equal,l resultingl inl thel serverl sendingl thel repliesl tol itself,l causingl itl tol crash.
Q:l Describel al Reflectionl andl Amplificationl attack.
Answer:
Reflectionl attackl -l masterl directsl slavesl tol sendl spoofedl requestsl tol al veryl largel numberl ofl reflectorsl (serversl thatl sendl al responsel tol al request).l Thel slavel setsl thel sourcel addressl ofl thel packetsl tol thel victimsl IPl address,l therebyl redirectingl thel responsel ofl thel reflectorsl tol thel victim.l Thus,l thel victiml receivesl millionsl ofl reflectorsl resultingl inl exhaustingl ofl it'sl bandwidth
Amplificationl comesl intol playl whenl thel sentl requestsl causel thel reflectorsl tol sendl veryl largel responsesl tol thel victim
Q:l Whatl arel thel defensesl againstl DDoSl attacks?
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