Moore was a Moral Relativist
Answer a. TRUE b. FALSE
The correct answer and explanation is:
Correct Answer: b. FALSE
G. E. Moore was not a moral relativist. He is best known for his defense of moral realism and ethical non-naturalism, especially in his work Principia Ethica (1903). In that text, Moore argued that moral terms like “good” refer to objective properties that do not depend on personal opinions, cultural beliefs, or social conventions. This directly contrasts with moral relativism.
Moral relativism is the view that what is morally right or wrong depends on individual or cultural beliefs. According to this view, there are no universal moral truths that apply to all people at all times. For instance, if one culture believes something is morally acceptable and another culture disagrees, both positions could be equally valid under moral relativism.
Moore rejected this kind of thinking. He famously proposed the “open question argument,” which shows that defining “good” in terms of natural properties like pleasure or desire-satisfaction is flawed. He claimed that good is a simple, indefinable property that can be known through intuition. This position aligns more closely with moral objectivism—the idea that some moral statements are true independently of beliefs or cultures.
Moore’s approach is often called ethical intuitionism. He believed humans have a kind of intuitive awareness of moral truths, much like the awareness of logical or mathematical truths. Because his philosophy rests on the idea of objective moral facts, it stands in direct opposition to moral relativism.
In conclusion, Moore cannot be categorized as a moral relativist. He was committed to the idea that moral values are real, knowable, and independent of human opinion. This foundational belief forms a core part of 20th-century analytic ethics.